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URING the Survey period, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
issued a number of decisions, although the term overall was not
remarkable. A consistent theme during this time period is the
imposition of increasingly stringent barriers to reconsideration of results
achieved in the trial courts.
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In Ex parte Bauder,1 the Court of Criminal Appeals revisited its deci-
sion in Bauder v. State,2 in which the court held that the double jeopardy
provision of the Texas Constitution may be interpreted more broadly
than the similar protection embodied in the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 3
Appellant Bauder was charged with driving while intoxicated. His sec-
ond trial ended in a mistrial after the prosecutor questioned the arresting
officer and elicited extraneous misconduct by the appellant. Before the
third trial, the appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas
* B.A., University of Texas; J.D., University of Texas. Ms. Lobel is with Milner,
Lobel, Goranson, Sorrels, Udashen & Wells, a professional association, of Dallas, Texas.
1. 974 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
2. 921 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
3. See id. at 699.
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corpus and claimed further prosecution was barred under the Texas and
United States Constitutions. The trial court found that the prosecutor
deliberately elicited the extraneous misconduct evidence in order to prej-
udice the appellant but also found that the testimony was not intended to
provoke a mistrial.
The court of appeals affirmed. 4 It found no jeopardy bar as a conse-
quence of the mistrial and concluded that the Texas Constitution ac-
corded no greater protection than the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause. 5 The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and re-
manded the case for consideration of the state constitutional claim that a
subsequent prosecution was jeopardy-barred. 6 On remand, the appellate
court applied the standard it believed the court had enunciated-that a
subsequent trial was barred only if the mistrial was in fact necessary and
the prosecutorial conduct either intended to provoke a mistrial or con-
sciously disregarded the risk that a mistrial would result.7 The court of
appeals concluded that a subsequent trial was not barred because the trial
court was not required, under the circumstances, to grant the motion for
mistrial."
Once the case returned to the Court of Criminal Appeals on petition
for discretionary review the decision of the appellate court was again re-
versed.9 The court held that the appellate court had applied an incorrect
standard of review by concluding "that it must determine 'whether any
reasonable view of the record supports not granting the mistrial." ' 10 The
critical question, the court observed, "is not the correctness of the ruling
granting the mistrial," but rather "whether the defendant truly consented
to the mistrial."' I Thus, the court reasoned that the appellate court must
instead determine whether the appellant was "required to move for a
mistrial because the prosecutor deliberately or recklessly crossed 'the line
between legitimate adversarial gamesmanship and manifestly improper
methods' that rendered trial before the jury unfair to such a degree that
no judicial admonishment could have cured it.' ' 12
II. THE ACCOMPLICE WITNESS RULE
In Blake v. State, 13 the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the accom-
plice witness rule to juvenile cases, overruling its previous decisions in
4. See Bauder v. State, 880 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, pet.
granted).
5. See id.
6. See Bauder, 921 S.W.2d at 698.
7. See Bauder v. State, 936 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, pet.
granted).
8. See id. at 22.
9. See Bauder, 974 S.W.2d at 732.
10. Id. at 731 (quoting Bauder, 936 S.W.2d at 22).
11. Id. at 731-32.
12. Id. at 732 (citing Bauder, 721 S.W.2d at 700) (footnote omitted).
13. 971 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
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Komurke v. State14 and Villarreal v. State.15 The accomplice witness rule is
a creature of statute; it is mandated neither by common law nor the
United States Constitution. 16 The rule provides in pertinent part: "A
conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless cor-
roborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the
offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely
shows the commission of the offense."'17
In abolishing the exception to the accomplice witness rule that had
been created for juvenile cases, the court in Blake reviewed in detail the
permutations of that rule as well as its evolution in juvenile cases. 18 Most
of the case law involving juvenile accomplice witnesses evolved in the
context of sexual offenses involving children. Initially, child participants
involved in unlawful sexual behavior with adults were treated as accom-
plices.19 The "conclusion that children could be accomplices led to the
remarkable result that male juvenile victims who were sodimized by
pedophiles, and had sufficient discretion to understand that such an act
was wrong, were considered accomplices in the perpetration of their own
abuse."'20 The court noted further that "[tihis put boys in a catch-22; they
were presumed accomplices, and to prove otherwise they had to prove
they struggled against their attackers, but generally there were no wit-
nesses as to the assault to corroborate their testimony. '21 On the other
hand, "[t]he results in cases involving female juvenile victims apparently
depended on the crime with which the defendant was charged. '22 But,
"[i]n cases where the victim was a relative, it was common for the prose-
cutor to elect to charge the defendant with incest instead of statutory
rape. If the victim failed to prove that her 'participation' was due to
threats, duress, or undue influence, she was an accomplice as a matter of
14. 562 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
15. 708 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
16. See Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 454 & n.6. Corroboration of an accomplice's testimony is
not required under federal law or the federal constitution. See id. (citing Brown v. Collins,
937 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Hayes, 49 F.3d 178 (6th Cir. 1995); Harrington v. Nix, 983 F.2d 872 (8th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1993)).
17. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.4 (Vernon 1979).
18. See Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 455-61. An accomplice is a blameworthy participant who
could be prosecuted for the same offense as the defendant, or a lesser included offense.
See id. at 454-55. It is irrelevant whether the person is actually charged and prosecuted for
the offense. See id. at 455. Where the evidence leaves little or no doubt that the individual
was involved in the offense, the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law and the court
must so instruct the jury. See id. Alternatively, where "the evidence presented . . .is
conflicting, and it is not clear whether the witness is an accomplice, the jury must initially
determine whether the witness is an accomplice as a matter of fact." Id.
19. See Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 453.
20. Id. at 456.
21. Id. at 456 n.20.
22. Id. at 456 n.18. For example, statutory rape victims were not considered accom-
plices. See, e.g., Soliz v. State, 163 Tex. Crim. 508, 293 S.W.2d 662 (1956); Lacey v. State,
137 Tex. Crim. 87, 127 S.W.2d 890 (1939).
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law."'23 It is the presumed status of juveniles as accomplices, predicated
upon their participation in unlawful sexual conduct and their ability to
form the requisite criminal intent, that led to this anomalous treatment of
child victims as accomplices. In Hinson v. State,24 for example, the court
overturned the defendant's conviction because the juvenile he sodomized
was an accomplice and the juvenile's testimony was uncorroborated.
In Komurke v. State,2 5 the defendant argued that his conviction for sod-
omy should be overturned because the evidence established that his al-
leged victim was an accomplice as a matter of law and that the trial court
erred in failing to so instruct the jury. The court held that a juvenile
under a certain age could not be prosecuted and thus could not be an
accomplice or the subject of the accomplice witness rule.2 6 In Villarreal v.
State,27 a capital murder case, the defendant urged that the trial court had
erred in refusing to give an accomplice witness instruction with respect to
an eleven-year-old witness who testified for the State. The court held
that the juvenile witness could not have been prosecuted (due to her age),
and therefore, "it necessarily follow[ed] that she could not have been an
accomplice witness."'28
The court in Blake believed that in Villarreal, no evidence was
presented that the juvenile was involved in the crime except for the de-
fendant's testimony that she had asked him "whether he was too
'chicken' to kill the victim." '2 9 This absence of blameworthiness distin-
guished Villarreal from the court's earlier decision in Harris v. State,30 in
which the court found error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury
so that it could determine whether a fifteen-year-old witness was an ac-
complice. The tension between the line of cases represented by Villarreal
23. Id. In one case the Court of Appeals held that the "underage daughter-victim was
an accomplice because she appeared sufficiently strong-willed to resist." See Blake, 971
S.W.2d at 456 n.18 (citing Wilson v. State, 393 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965)).
"In another case [the court] overturned an incest conviction where the defendant had
forced his stepdaughter-victim to have sex with him while she was between the ages of ten
and fifteen because the victim did not make an outcry and had therefore 'consented,' even
though she testified she said nothing due to fear of her stepfather." Id. (citing Wilson v.
State, 147 Tex. Crim. 653, 184 S.W.2d 141 (1944)).
24. 152 Tex. Crim. 159, 211 S.W.2d 750 (1948).
25. 562 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
26. See id. at 234. In reviewing application of the accomplice witness rule in juvenile
cases, the court in Komurke relied upon the 1967 amendments to Article 30 of the Penal
Code, which provided: "No person may be convicted of any offense except perjury, which
was committed before he was 15 years of age; and for perjury only when it appears by
proof that he had sufficient discretion to understand the nature and obligation of an oath."
Id. at 233. Komurke overturned the court's earlier decision in Slusser, which concluded
that juveniles could be treated as accomplices if they possessed the requisite intent, since
Article 30 of the Penal Code at that time provided that a child between the ages of 9 and
13 could not be criminally prosecuted for an offense unless the child "had discretion suffi-
cient to understand the nature and illegalities of the act." Id. (citing Slusser v. State, 155
Tex. Crim. 160, 232 S.W.2d 727 (1950)).
27. 708 S.W.2d 845, 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
28. Id. at 848.
29. See Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 457 & n.22.
30. 645 S.W.2d 447, 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
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on the one hand and Harris on the other was resolved in Blake, where the
court expressly held:
[T]he juvenile justice exception to the accomplice witness rule-that
juveniles who are blameworthy participants in crimes are unilaterally
exempt from the accomplice witness rule-is not supported by the
decisions of this Court, is not supported by current statute, and is
contrary to the purpose of the accomplice witness rule. 31
Accordingly, the court expressly overruled contrary decisions and abol-
ished the juvenile exception to the accomplice witness rule: "The testi-
mony of juveniles who could potentially be subject to State-sanctioned
punishment is now subject to the accomplice witness rule, in the same
manner as the testimony of adults." '32 Carefully read, the court reasoned,
neither its decision in Villarreal (which involved no evidence of the juve-
nile's participation in the crime) nor its decision in Harris (which held
that any person indicted for the same offense is an accomplice as a matter
of law, irrespective of age) is inconsistent with the court's ruling in
Blake.33 Furthermore, the court observed that the earlier case law exem-
plified by Komurke "no longer serves the purpose which it once did,
namely to allow the uncorroborated testimony of juvenile victims of sex-
ual assault to convict adult assailants," since extensive changes in the Pe-
nal Code "make it clear that children are not accomplices of their
attackers." 34
The Blake court also observed that "[legal bars to prosecution did not
remove accomplice status for purposes of the accomplice witness rule."' 35
In this regard, the decision in Blake reveals an interesting statutory evolu-
tion with respect to persons exempt from prosecution. The court noted,
"[flor example, under the 1925 Penal Code, the prosecution of relatives
and servants of the defendant was barred ... provided that '[tihe follow-
ing cannot be accessories; [t]he husband or wife of the offender, his
brothers and sisters, his relations in the ascending or descending line by
consanguinity or affinity, or his domestic servants.' 36 This legislative bar
to prosecution of relatives lending aid to a person other than as a princi-
ple (that is, as an accessory) embodies a value which no longer enjoys the
status of codification, with the exception of marital privilege. In any
event, the court had previously rejected the argument that this bar to
prosecution of a relative as an accessory also precluded the person's
designation as an accomplice witness. 37
31. Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 458.
32. Id. at 459.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 458 (citing TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 21.11 (Indecency with a Child) § 22.011
(Sexual Assault), § 22.021 (Aggravated Sexual Assault) (Vernon 1994)).
35. Id. at 459.
36. Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 459-60 (quoting TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 78 (Vernon
1925)).
37. See id. at 460 (discussing Turner v. State, 117 Tex. Crim. 434, 37 S.W.2d 747(1931)).
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Blake is significant not only because it does away with the juvenile ex-
ception to the witness accomplice rule but also because it makes a strong
statement about that rule. "The heart of the accomplice witness rule is
the legislature's inherent suspicion and belief in the untrustworthiness of
the accomplice's testimony. ' 38 The court went on to observe that: "[t]he
rule's roots can be traced to common law, where interested parties were
precluded from testifying in both criminal and civil cases-'fear of per-
jury was the reason for this rule."' 39 "The United States Supreme Court
recognized that the basis of such rules was to set aside a class of persons
who were more likely to commit perjury than other witnesses. '40 The
Blake court explained the underlying principle behind the distrust of ac-
complice testimony:
This suspicion and fear of perjury is not without reason. Accom-
plices often strike bargains with the [S]tate, where the prosecutor
agrees to a favorable sentencing recommendation in exchange for
the accomplice's testimony against another person .... In addition,
those accused of crimes tend to try to place the responsibility for the
commission of the crime on the other participants while downplaying
their own participation, often in order to avoid the consequences of
criminal acts. For these reasons, and to protect the criminal defend-
ant in each case, the legislature has determined that uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice is not enough to support a criminal
conviction. 41
Given the compelling considerations underlying the accomplice witness
rule, the court held: "There is no reason to suppose the testimony of
blameworthy juveniles potentially subject to punishment by the State is
any less suspect than the testimony of blameworthy adults. '42
III. POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE COURTS
A. AUTHORITY TO ORDER PAYMENT OF COURT COSTS
In Busby v. State,43 the Court of Criminal Appeals considered the limits
on the district court's authority to impose certain alleged "court costs" as
a condition of community supervision. Appellant had entered pleas of
guilty to five indictments which charged misapplication of fiduciary prop-
erty. His punishment in each case was ten years of incarceration; the
punishment was suspended for ten years and the appellant was placed on
community supervision for that period. In one of the cases, a condition of
community supervision was imposed which required the appellant to pay
court costs, including a $230,695.21 reimbursement to the county for the
cost of the attorney pro tern appointed to represent the State after the
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 335, 13 S. Ct. 60 (1892)).
40. Id. (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S. Ct. 1920 (1967) (rejecting the
federal rule that co-defendants were only competent witnesses for the state)).
41. Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 460.
42. Id.
43. 984 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
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district attorney recused himself.44 The court of appeals held that the
district court had no authority to order the appellant to pay those costs. 45
The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretion-
ary review and affirmed the court of appeals.46
Noting that Texas courts have no inherent authority to grant probation,
the court observed that the judicial authority to grant probation has two
sources. 47 First, the Texas Constitution confers upon courts having origi-
nal jurisdiction of criminal actions "the power, after conviction, to sus-
pend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the defendant
upon probation and to reimpose such sentence, under such conditions as
the Legislature may prescribe. '48 "The other source of authority to grant
probation is the general legislative power itself,"'49 which has been exer-
cised to give the courts authority to suspend sentences. Pursuant to
either source of power "the granting of probation is completely subject to
legislative regulation."50 Thus, the court concluded that a probation con-
dition requiring reimbursement of payments to the attorney pro tem must
have a statutory basis.51
The State argued that article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provided that authority, because it permits the courts to "impose any rea-
sonable condition that is designed to protect or restore the community
....52 The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this argument, because a
more specific provision of the Code states that: "A judge may not order a
defendant to make any payments as a term or condition of community
supervision, except for fines, court costs, restitution to the victim, and
other conditions related personally to the rehabilitation of the defendant
or otherwise expressly authorized by law."'53 The court likewise rejected
the State's alternative argument that reimbursement for costs of the at-
torney pro tern was authorized as a legitimate cost of court. 54 Such costs
include payment to the attorney appointed to represent the indigent de-
fendant. 55 Thus, according to the State's argument, attorney pro tern
costs also may be assessed as a cost of court since the attorney pro tern
"shall receive compensation in the same amount and manner" as counsel
44. For the distinction between an attorney pro tern (who replaces the holder of the
prosecutor's office) and a special prosecutor (who works with the office-holder), see gener-
ally State v. Rosenbaum, 852 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (opinion of Clinton,
J.). Id. at 628 n.2.
45. See Busby v. State, 951 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. granted).
46. See Busby, 984 S.W.2d at 628, 631.
47. See id. at 628.
48. Id. (quoting TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 11(A)).
49. Id. at 629 (the general legislative power is created in article III, § 1 of the Texas
Constitution).
50. Id.
51. See Busby, 984 S.W.2d at 629.
52. Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CRJM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1999)).
53. Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 11(b) (Vernon Supp.
1999)).
54. See id. at 630.
55. See id. & n.9 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(d) (providing that
payments for appointed counsel may be included as costs of court)).
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appointed to represent an indigent person.56 The court rejected the
State's argument, observing:
The public policy of having the defendant bear the cost of the de-
fense attorney is a familiar part of our legal system. A public policy
of having defendants reimburse the state for the costs of the prose-
cuting attorney would be a novelty, one which we will not impute to
the legislature on such tenuous statutory language as that which the
state has presented. 57
B. REVIEW OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL
In Cain v. State,58 the court revisited its decision in Clewis v. State,59 in
which it held for the first time that the appellate courts could undertake a
factual review of elements of the offense in order to determine whether
the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction. 60 This fac-
tual review could be undertaken without the previous requirement that
the evidence must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion" and the court could set aside verdicts which were "contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and un-just."'6 1 Prior to Clewis, appellate courts examined the record in chal-
lenges to sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction only for the
legal constitutional sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set
forth in Jackson v. Virginia.62
In Cain, the appellant was convicted of having violated the civil rights
of a prisoner. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, 63 and the
Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary
review, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for consideration
of sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson v. Virginia.64 The court of
appeals again reversed after determining that although the evidence was
legally (constitutionally) sufficient, it nevertheless was factually insuffi-
cient to support the conviction.65 The Court of Criminal Appeals granted
the State's petition for discretionary review to consider the question of
whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard in evaluating
the factual sufficiency of the evidence. After having reviewed in some
detail the evidence adduced at trial, the court found that the court of
appeals had failed to accord sufficient deference to the jury's verdict in
56. See Busby, 984 S.W.2d at 631 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.07(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1999)).
57. Id. at 631.
58. 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
59. 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
60. See id. at 132.
61. Id. at 129.
62. 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979, pet. granted).
63. Cain v. State, No. 12-93-00155-CR (Tex. App.-Tyler Apr. 28, 1995) (not desig-
nated for publication) (pet. granted).
64. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 405.
65. Cain v. State, No. 12-93-00155-CR (Tex. App.-Tyler Sept. 30, 1996, pet. granted)
(not designated for publication).
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conducting its review. 66
The Court of Criminal Appeals began its analysis of the court of ap-
peals' decision (which found that "the verdict was so contrary to the over-
whelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust"), 67 by
noting the constitutional jurisdictional limitations upon its own power of
review. 68 The court pointed to the Texas Constitution's "factual con-
clusivity clause" which provides that "the decision of [the courts of ap-
peals] shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before them on
appeal or error."'69 The court noted that "[t]his clause operates as a juris-
dictional limitation on this Court, so that we are without jurisdiction to
'pass upon the weight and preponderance of the evidence or 'unfind' a
vital fact.' "70 Recognizing that its "inability to decide questions of fact
precludes de novo review of courts of appeals' factual decisions," the
court concluded that the lower court's decision was nevertheless review-
able for the "purely legal" determination of "[w]hether the correct rule of
law was applied. '71
The court decided that the court of appeals had incorrectly applied the
standard of review because "it was not deferential to the jury's determi-
nation of witness credibility, it ignored the evidence supporting the jury's
guilty verdict, and considered only the evidence that could be interpreted
as favoring the defense theory of the case."'72 In particular, the court
challenged the court of appeals' analysis of the weight to accord contra-
dictory testimonial evidence, a matter "within the sole province of the
jury, because it turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. '73
This analysis is somewhat confusing, however, since the purpose of a fac-
tual sufficiency review, as held in Clewis and acknowledged by the court
in Cain, is to determine "without the prism of 'in the light most favorable
to the prosecution' ",74 whether the verdict is so against the weight of the
evidence as to constitute a miscarriage of justice.75
The court of appeals had previously discounted the testimony of the
victim in conducting its factual sufficiency review largely because the
complainant admitted a degree of intoxication that concededly made it
difficult for him to remember the events of the previous evening when
appellant, the arresting constable, had struck him. In the view of the
Court of Criminal Appeals, however, this factor did not "definitively
66. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407-09.
67. Cain v. State, No. 12-93-00155-CR (Tex. App.-Tyler Sept. 30, 1996, pet. granted)
(not designated for publication).
68. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 408 (quoting Cain v. State, No. 12-93-00155 CR (Tex.
App.-Tyler Sept. 30, 1996, pet. granted) (not designated for publication )).
69. Id. at 408 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6).
70. Id. (citing Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 408-09.
74. Id. (citing Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129).
75. See id. at 406-407.
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favor or contradict the jury's verdict. ' 76 The court found it "equally plau-
sible that the victim's story, although 'confused' [was] true and credi-
ble."'77 Since the victim's testimony did not weigh definitively in favor of,
or against, appellant's guilt, the determination was within the exclusive
province of the jury, and the court of appeals was required to defer to the
jury's finding.78 Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that
the lower tribunal had applied the Clewis standard of review incorrectly
and remanded the cause for proceedings not inconsistent with its
opinion.79
C. JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES
In Davis v. State,80 the Court of Criminal Appeals sought to distinguish
a court's jurisdiction from a judge's authority to act. Appellant pleaded
guilty to possession of a controlled substance before a magistrate and was
placed on probation pursuant to a plea agreement. Subsequently, the dis-
trict court revoked the appellant's probation and sentenced him to con-
finement. On appeal, the appellant argued that the revocation was
invalid because the order which placed him on probation was void due to
the fact that the district judge's order referring the case to the magistrate
was not signed until after the plea of guilty before the magistrate. Appel-
lant argued on appeal, and the court of appeals agreed, that since the
order of referral was untimely, jurisdiction had not been conferred upon
the magistrate to preside over the plea proceeding. The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review and re-
versed the judgment of the court of appeals. 8 1
The Texas Government Code provides for criminal law magistrates in
Tarrant County and elsewhere.8 2 Accordingly, district judges are author-
ized to refer certain types of cases to magistrates pursuant to an order of
referral. 83 The district court may reject, modify or correct the magis-
trate's actions; if it takes no action, the magistrate's action becomes the
decree of the trial court.8 Appellant in Davis made no objection to the
defect in the trial court's proceeding and the State argued that the appel-
lant therefore had waived any error. Appellant contended that this argu-
ment could be presented for the first time on appeal because it was a
jurisdictional claim. The court of appeals agreed that the error could be
raised at any time since the authority of the magistrate to preside was
jurisdictional under Spindler v. State.85
76. Id. at 409
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 410.
80. 956 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
81. See id. at 556.
82. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.651 et seq. (Vernon 1998).
83. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.656 & 54.657 (Vernon 1998).
84. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.662 (Vernon 1998).
85. See Davis v. State, 928 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. granted)(citing Spindler v. State, 740 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
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The State argued that Spindler was no longer binding given a subse-
quent amendment to the Texas Constitution which provides that "[tihe
presentment of an indictment or information to a court invests the court
with jurisdiction of the cause."'86 The State reasoned "that since the in-
dictment invests jurisdiction in the district court for which the magistrate
acts, once vested, the district court's jurisdiction cannot be defeated by
irregularities in the manner in which the case was referred to the magis-
trate. '87 The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and distinguished be-
tween the jurisdiction of courts and the authority of judges, holding:
"Strictly speaking then, jurisdiction encompasses only the power of the
tribunal over the subject matter and the person."88 The court pointed out
that the term "jurisdiction" is often misapplied, and quoted article V, Sec-
tion 1 of the Texas Constitution, which explains that:
The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, in one Court of Criminal Appeals, in Courts of Appeals, in
District Courts, in County Courts, in Commissioner's Court, in
courts of the Justices of the Peace, and in other such courts as may be
provided by law. The Legislature may establish such other courts as
it may deem necessary and prescribe the jurisdiction and organiza-
tion thereof, and may conform the jurisdiction of the district and
other inferior courts thereto.8 9
Thus, the court reiterated the reasoning in Ex parte George and stated
that: "[j]urisdiction, in its narrow sense, is something possessed by courts,
not by judges .... The judge is merely an officer of the court, like the
lawyers, the bailiff and the court reporter. . . . He is not the court
itself."90
Having agreed with the State's position, the court was careful to add the
caveat that
[Ilit is incorrect to suggest that the authority of the judge presiding
over the case has no bearing on the validity of the proceeding [for]
[t]his Court has explained that a judgment is not immune from juris-
dictional challenge simply because an indictment has been returned;
the judge must also have authority to preside over the case. 91
The court noted, for example, that "a judge's disqualification arising
from a constitutional or statutory provision 'affects jurisdiction' and ren-
ders the proceeding a nullity."'92
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals in Spindler held that the mag-
istrate's authority in a case was jurisdictional, 93 the court in Davis ex-
pressly "disavow[ed] that characterization" and held that the untimely
86. Davis, 956 S.W.2d at 557 (quoting TEX. CONST. art. V, §12).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 558.
89. See id. at 557 (quoting TEX. CONsT. art. V, §1).
90. Davis, 956 S.W.2d at 557-58 (quoting Ex parte George, 913 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995)).
91. Id. at 558 (citing Johnson v. State, 869 S.W.2d 347, 349 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
92. Id. (citing Lee v. State, 555 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)).
93. See Spindler, 740 S.W.2d at 793.
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referral order did not divest the court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.94
Because "the magistrate merely acts as a surrogate for the judge," 95 and
because the magistrate's acts are binding only if adopted by the referring
court,9 6 the irregularity is not a fatal jurisdictional defect. Accordingly,
an objection is required in order for the matter to be raised on appeal. In
sum, "jurisdiction was not effected and the order placing Appellant on
probation was not void even though a procedural irregularity arose due
to the untimeliness of the referral order. '97
D. JURISDICTION: CHARGING INSTRUMENT
Just as Davis considered a conviction that is "voidable, but not void"
(for lack of jurisdiction), 98 the court in Duron v. State99 revisited the
question whether jurisdiction is conferred by "an accusatory pleading
which only purported to be, but was not in fact, an 'indictment or infor-
mation' as defined in the Texas Constitution."'01 ) As Davis noted and as
Duron recognizes,101 it is the indictment which confers jurisdiction upon
the court. One view of the issue is that a charging instrument which fails
to state an offense is not an indictment, and therefore, cannot trigger the
jurisdiction of the court.102 The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, has
not engaged in such a strict construction.
The failure of the charging instrument to fully set forth an offense was,
for a time, considered a fundamental defect which rendered the judgment
of conviction based upon the defective "indictment" void (as opposed to
merely voidable, a challenge requiring an objection in the trial court in
order to raise the error on appeal). 1" 3 The judgment, if based upon a void
charging instrument, could be attacked for the first time in collateral pro-
ceedings and on appeal. 104 "[T]he constitutional requirement of an 'in-
dictment' meant an indictment that was pleaded under the practice at the
time the Constitution of 1876 was adopted-that is, one that had all the
essential elements. 10 5
In 1985 the Legislature, in an attempt to assure that convictions were
not reversed due to defects not objected to prior to trial, mandated "that
convictions not be reversed on account of any pleading defects which
94. Davis, 956 S.W.2d at 559.
95. Id. at 557 (citing Kelly v. State, 724 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
96. The magistrate's actions are deemed to have been adopted if the trial court does
not alter them. See id. at 560 n.4 (quoting TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.652 (Vernon
1998)).
97. Id. at 560.
98. Id. at 559.
99. 956 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
100. Id. at 548.
101. See id. at 552 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
102. See id. at 552.
103. See id. at 553-54.
104. See Duron, 956 S.W.2d at 553-54 (Womack, J., concurring) (citing Standley v.
State, 517 S.W.2d 538, 541 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); White v. State, 1 Tex. App. 211, 215
(1876) (burglary indictment failed to state elements of the theft)).
105. Id. at 554 (citing Williams v. State, 12 Tex. App. 395 (1882) (footnote omitted)).
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were not called to the attention of the court prior to trial. '10 6 However,
the argument arose that a defective charging instrument was not actually
an indictment or information protected by the new legislation. 107 In
Studer v. State,10 8 the Court of Criminal Appeals held "that the constitu-
tional mandate that an indictment 'charge an offense' does not mean 'that
each element of the offense must be alleged .... "109 The court in Du-
ron recognized that Studer stood for the proposition that the pleading
need not actually charge commission of an offense to constitute an indict-
ment or information under the Texas Constitution.110 Choosing a middle
ground, the Duron court held "that a written instrument is an indictment
or information under the Constitution if it accuses someone of a crime
with enough clarify and specificity to identify the penal statute under
which the State intends to prosecute, even if the instrument is otherwise
defective."'
The particular argument raised in Duron was that the allegations of
indecency with a child112 specified a form of sexual contact between the
appellant and the child which was outside the statutory definition of sex-
ual conduct. The court emphatically rejected this argument, stating that
the case did "not involve a charging instrument which [was] even argua-
bly defective on account of its failure to include one or more allegations
necessary to give notice of the statutory offense with which the defendant
was charged." 113
In an interesting aside, the court pointed to the importance of preserv-
ing a defendant's constitutional right to have a grand jury determine
106. Id. at 548 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon Supp. 1999)).
The statute provides in pertinent part:
If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or
substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial
on the merits commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the
defect, error, or irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or
in any other post-conviction proceeding.
Id.
Judge Womack observed in his concurrence that this legislation, which accompanied the
1985 constitutional amendment, was "specifically intended to undo the doctrine of the fun-
damentally defective indictment. Id. at 554 (citing TEX. CONST. article V, Section
12(b)). The article states:
An indictment is a written instrument presented to a court by a grand jury
charging a person with the commission of an offense. An information is a
written instrument presented to a court by an attorney for the State charging
a person with the commission of an offense. The practice and procedures
relating to the use of indictments and informations, including their contents,
amendment, sufficiency, and requisites, are as provided by law. The present-
ment of an indictment or information to a court invests the court with juris-
diction of the cause.
Id.
107. See id. at 548-49.
108. 799 S.W.2d 263, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc).
109. Duron, 956 S.W.2d at 549 (quoting Struder, 799 S.W.2d at 272).
110. See id. at 549.
111. Id. at 550-51.
112. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.11(a)(1) (Vernon 1994).
113. Duron, 956 S.W.2d at 551.
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whether there is probable cause to believe he has committed a particular
offense. 1 4 The court recognized that this right would be seriously under-
mined if the court were to "allow a written instrument to stand as an
indictment even when it does not contain enough information to point to
the offense charged ....
IV. APPEAL
The Court of Criminal Appeals in Curry v. State'1 6 reiterated its hold-
ing in Malik v. State1 7 that the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
conviction is determined in accordance with "the hypothetically correct
jury charge for the case,"I" as opposed to the actual charge given to the
jury. In Curry, the appellants were convicted of aggravated kidnapping.
The court of appeals reversed the conviction because the State amended
the indictment after the trial had begun. The court of appeals also ad-
dressed the question whether the evidence was sufficient to support the
conviction and concluded that the record did not contain evidence that
the appellant had abducted the victim by using (or threatening to use)
deadly force, as the indictment had alleged prior to its amendment. The
court of appeals found the evidence sufficient, however, when assessed in
light of the "theory of the offense submitted to the jury through the
court's charge."' 1 9 The appellant's petition for discretionary review chal-
lenged this conclusion. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the peti-
tion, vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for
reconsideration of the appellant's sufficiency claim in light of Malik.120
In Gomez v. State,121 the Court of Criminal Appeals revisited a recent
decision, Melendez v. State,122 in which it held that trial exhibits in a case
are part of the court reporter's notes, and therefore, are included in the
statement of facts. 123 The issue becomes important when a determination
must be made as to whether the appellant included portions of the record
in the designation of the contents of the record on appeal or, conversely,
when the impact of that designation is affected by the fact that a portion
of the record is lost or destroyed.
In Gomez, the appellant urged on appeal that because the exhibits
from his trial had been inadvertently destroyed, he was entitled to a re-
versal of his conviction. 124 Upon further analysis, the Gomez court deter-
114. See id. at 550-51 (citing TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 10 & art. V, § 12).
115. Id. at 550.
116. 975 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
117. 953 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
118. Curry, 975 S.W.2d 630 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
119. Curry v. State, 966 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, pet. granted).
120. See Curry, 975 S.W.2d at 630.
121. 962 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
122. 936 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
123. Id. at 292.
124. TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(f). The rule now provides that an appellant is entitled to a
new trial if he has requested the record, an important exhibit or portion of the record has
been lost or destroyed through no fault of the appellant, the exhibit or record portion is
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mined that its "initial conclusion in Melendez was erroneous for two
reasons: (1) it failed to adequately distinguish between original exhibits
and copies of exhibits; and (2) it failed to apply an harmless error analysis
to the lost exhibits before granting a new trial."1 25
The Gomez court held that "original exhibits are not part of the state-
ment of facts, but are part of the transcript, if so designated by the trial or
appellate court."'1 26 Further, the court concluded that its review of the
case was not hindered by the lost or destroyed exhibits and that, accord-
ingly, the missing portion of the record caused no harm to the
appellant. 127
A forceful dissent in Gomez complained that "[tihe majority errs in
reaching the merits of appellant's ground for review because the issue
was decided in Melendez v. State, which holds trial exhibits are part and
parcel of the court reporter's notes and constitute part of the statement of
facts. 1 28 The dissent also accused the majority of having reopened the
issue "because Melendez is unfavorable to their partisan agenda of reach-
ing results which favor the State.' 29 In the dissent's opinion, appellant
had "properly and timely requested a complete appellate record" and
was entitled to a reversal because the exhibits had been inadvertently
destroyed and could not be copied or replaced. 130 In addition, the dissent
believed the majority disingenuously ignored the fact that although the
appellant did not request inclusion of the exhibits in the transcript, the
appellant clearly requested inclusion of the exhibits in the statement of
facts (specifically citing appellant's designation and including it in the rec-
ord). 31 The majority found that the appellant had not specifically re-
quested inclusion of the exhibits and therefore could not complain of
their absence on appeal. 132 The dissent also challenged the court's harm-
less error analysis as a profound departure from precedent by stating that
"[t]his court has consistently held when an appellant's record is incom-
plete through no fault of his own, he need not demonstrate any harm and
is entitled to a per se reversal of his conviction. '133
The dissent bemoaned the majority's about-face:
The issue presented in this case, was decided only one year ago in
Melendez when we held exhibits are part of the statement of facts.
Today, the majority attempts to distinguish Melendez as not provid-
ing for the inclusion of original exhibits in the statement of facts.
"necessary to the appeal's resolution" (Rule 34.6(f)(3)), and the parties cannot agree on a
complete record.
125. Gomez, 962 S.W.2d at 574.
126. Id. at 575-76.
127. See id. at 576
128. Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
129. Id.
130. Gomez, 962 S.W.2d at 577-78. The dissent accused the majority of having not only
deprived appellant of the holding in Melendez but also of having analyzed appellant's posi-
tion under the old rules in order to deprive him of the benefit of the new rules. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 576.
133. Id. at 583.
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However, both the Rules ... and the customs of those engaged in the
practice of law dictate otherwise. There is simply no support in law
for the majority's conclusion. 134
Equally critical of the second aspect of the court's decision in Gomez
(in which it concludes original exhibits are not part of the statement of
facts), the dissent stated:
Likewise, the majority ignores case law holding the presentation of a
partial record renders a sufficiency of the evidence consideration im-
possible. Instead, the majority finds the absence of the original ex-
hibits from appellant's record to be 'harmless' thus, indicating
sufficiency of the evidence review in Texas does not require review of
the evidence. 135
Again, the dissent accused the majority of having chosen "to bulldoze
the existing law simply to reach a result which benefits the State. '136
In a criminal case, the State may appeal a pretrial order granting a
motion to suppress evidence, including a confession. 137 In State v. Taft,138
the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress oral statements
he made in conjunction with a polygraph examination.
The State appealed this ruling and the court of appeals reversed. The
court of appeals believed the statements had been excluded prematurely,
before the State actually sought to introduce them and before the trial
court could evaluate the proffer in context.' 39 The State nevertheless
sought discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals, urging that
the court of appeals had failed to consider the State's right to appeal a
suppression order.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reiterated its holding in State v. Rob-
erts140 that the State may not appeal a trial court ruling which merely
excludes evidence. The Roberts court refused to interpret the Code of
Criminal Procedure Article 44.01 to permit the appeal of any pretrial or-
der that excluded evidence, fearing that such an interpretation would not
only greatly expand pretrial appeals but also unduly restrict the trial
court's exercise of discretion.' 41
In Taft, the trial court granted a motion to "suppress" statements the
defendant made during a polygraph examination, concluding that admis-
sion of the evidence would have been more prejudicial than probative. 142
Thus, the order pertained to "evidence that was 'excluded' because of its
prejudicial nature, not evidence that was 'suppressed' because it was ille-
134. Gomez, 962 S.W.2d at 584.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (Vernon Supp 1999).
138. 958 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
139. See State v. Taft, 926 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, pet.
granted).
140. 940 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
141. See id. at 659-60.
142. TEX. GRIM. EVID. 403.
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gaily obtained. ' 143 Since the order was not appealable, the court of ap-
peals was without jurisdiction to decide the appeal. Accordingly, the
court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with instructions to
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
V. HEARSAY
In Johnson v. State,144 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a prior
written statement of a surviving victim was inadmissible hearsay and that
the trial court erred in having admitted the statement as a prior recollec-
tion recorded exempt from the hearsay exclusion.145 The court con-
cluded that the erroneous admission of the hearsay statement required
reversal of this capital murder conviction in which the death penalty was
imposed.
In this case, the surviving witness had given the police a detailed ac-
count of the circumstances leading up to the murder of his friend and the
witness' escape immediately after the murder. At trial, however, the sur-
viving victim had a curious change of heart and became completely non-
cooperative. The State's efforts to elicit from the witness any facts re-
lated to the murder were unavailing. The witness was shown his previous
statement and finally conceded that his recollection of events was better
at the time he prepared the statement than at the time of trial. On the
other hand, he also claimed that he could not remember any of the events
in question.
At the State's urging, the trial court admitted a written statement by
the surviving victim as a past recollection recorded. The defendant op-
posed the offer on the ground that it denied his right of confrontation
under the U.S. Constitution, 146 the Texas Constitution,' 47 and the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. 148
The Johnson court noted that the predicates for admission of a re-
corded past recollection are: (1) the witness had first-hand knowledge, (2)
the written statement is an original made at or near the time of the event,
(3) the witness does not presently recall the event, and (4) the witness
143. Taft, 958 S.W.2d at 843.
144. 967 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
145. See id. at 416-17. Certain matters are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarent is available as a witness, including recorded recollections. Texas Rule
of Criminal Evidence 803(5) provides:
Recorded Recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter
about which a witness once had personal knowledge but now has insufficient
recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the
witness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly, unless the circum-
stances of preparation cast doubt on the document's trustworthiness. If ad-
mitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not
itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
146. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
147. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.




attests to the accuracy of the written statement at trial.1 49 The court
found no evidence to support the requirement of first-hand knowledge,
because the witness offered no testimony regarding the basis for his state-
ment.151° Nor was there sufficient evidence to satisfy the additional predi-
cate of accuracy, because the witness never attested to the correctness of
the statement.1 51 The written statement was received in evidence and
contained references to an extraneous murder and other highly prejudi-
cial matters, so the court's harmless error analysis led to reversal of the
conviction, for the court was "unable to say with fair assurance that the
erroneous admission of [the surviving witness'] statement did not influ-
ence the jury or that its admission did not affect appellant's substantial
rights."1 52
VI. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
In Moore v. State,153 the Court of Criminal Appeals considered
whether the trial court had improperly refused a jury charge on voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of capital murder. The appel-
lant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
At the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, the State and the appellant
each called one eyewitness. The accounts of the two eyewitnesses were
markedly different. The State's eyewitness, after spending several hours
at a club where the appellant and the victim also were present, observed
the murder victim in a confrontation with the appellant. According to the
eyewitness's testimony, after the confrontation ended and as the victim
left in a car from the club's parking lot, the appellant fired into the car
with a rifle, killing both occupants. In contrast to the testimony of the
State's eyewitness, the appellant's half brother described a serious con-
frontation instigated by the victim, whose behavior was not merely offen-
sive but threatening to the appellant. According to the appellant's
witness, this direct confrontation was followed by an attempt by the vic-
tim to hit the appellant with the car the victims were driving.
The appellant sought a lesser included offense instruction on voluntary
manslaughter which, at the time of these offenses, provided that: "[a] per-
son commits an offense if he causes the death of an individual under cir-
cumstances that would constitute murder ... except that he caused the
death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an
149. See id. The court considered the "assertion of the statement's accuracy in the ac-
knowledgment line of a written memorandum or [a previous acknowledgment under
oath]" and emphasized that "[n]o statement should be allowed to verify itself, especially by
boilerplate language routinely added by police, lawyers, or others experienced in litiga-




152. Id. at 417.




The first determination to be made in considering whether a lesser in-
cluded offense instruction is appropriate is whether the lesser included
offense is in fact part of the proof necessary to establish the offense al-
leged. 155 Second, the evidence must be evaluated to determine whether
it would permit a rational determination that the defendant is guilty only
of the lesser offense.1 56 Thus, there must be some evidence from which a
reasonable jury could acquit the defendant of the greater offense and
convict him of the lesser. In deciding whether to give the lesser included
offense instruction "[t]he court may not consider whether the evidence is
credible, controverted, or in conflict with other evidence. '1 57
In addressing the appellant's contention that the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, the court referred to its previous plurality decision in
Bradley v. State.158 In Bradley, the plurality held that "murder had an
unwritten, implied element of lack of passion, on which the jury did not
have to be charged unless evidence raised the issue. ' 159 In addition, "the
State has the burden to disprove sudden passion beyond a reasonable
doubt to convict for murder, and the burden to prove the existence of
sudden passion beyond a reasonable doubt to convict for voluntary man-
slaughter. ' 160 Based on this logic, the plurality in Bradley ordered the
appellant acquitted because the proof was sufficient to have established
murder, but there was no evidence of sudden passion sufficient to sustain
a conviction of voluntary manslaughter.161 Subsequent cases failed to re-
solve the issue.1 62 Noting that plurality opinions are of limited preceden-
tial value, the Johnson court expressly overruled the Bradley plurality and
held that "voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense to
murder." 163
The court in Moore also overruled its previous decision in Ojeda v.
State,164 in which it held that the issue of voluntary manslaughter was not
raised by "an objective recitation of acts-appellant was hit and he re-
sponded,"1 65 as this was insufficient to show sudden passion because
154. Id. at 8 (quoting TEX. PEN. CODE. ANN. § 19.04 (Vernon 1994)). This was the
definition of voluntary manslaughter under the Penal Code for offenses committed before
September 1, 1994. For offenses committed after that date, sudden passion is an issue to be
considered at the punishment phase of a murder trial. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN.
§ 19.02(d) (Vernon 1993).
155. See id. at 8.
156. See id.
157. Id. (citing Havard v. State, 800 S.W.2d 195, 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
158. 688 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
159. Id. at 851 n.5.
160. Id. at 851.
161. See id. at 853.
162. See Johnson v. State, 815 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Lee, 818
S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
163. Johnson, 969 S.W.2d at 9-10.
164. 712 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
165. Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 11 (quoting Ojeda, 712 S.W.2d at 744).
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there was no direct evidence as to the appellant's frame of mind at the
time. In rejecting Ojeda's insistence upon "direct evidence" of the de-
fendant's state of mind, the court in Moore "reaffirm[ed]" that "sudden
passion is essentially a culpable mental state" which does not require di-
rect evidence beyond the "acts and circumstances of the offense. '166
VII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In Posey v. State,167 the Court of Criminal Appeals considered whether
trial courts have a duty sua sponte to instruct the jury on defensive issues.
In this case, the owner of a 1998 black Jaguar had left it parked at the
airport; subsequently, the appellant was found driving the same automo-
bile when it was stopped by the police because the car's registration
sticker had expired. The appellant could produce neither a license nor
proof of insurance. He claimed that a person he had just met gave him
permission to drive the Jaguar, and his cousin and another acquaintance
corroborated this statement.
On appeal, the appellant complained for the first time that the trial
court sua sponte should have instructed the jury on the defense of mis-
take of fact (e.g., that he was mistaken in his alleged beliefs that he had
permission to drive the car or in that the person who gave him permission
had the authority to authorize his use of the car). The appellant re-
quested no such instruction at trial, nor did he object to the court's failure
to so instruct the jury. Applying the court's opinion in Almanza v.
State,168 the court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a
new trial, having concluded that the appellant was "egregiously harmed"
by the absence of a mistake of fact instruction.1 69 The Court of Criminal
Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review "to decide
whether Almanza applies to the omission in the jury charge of defensive
issues that have not been properly preserved by defendant's request or
objection." 170
In Almanza, the court considered the effect of a failure to request an
instruction or to object to an instruction given in the trial court. 171 The
Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the continuing validity of Al-
166. Id. at 10. The court also observed that evidence "relevant to proving up adequate
cause is not used up or limited to that element; it may also be relevant to proving sudden
passion." Id. at 11.
167. 966 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
168. 686 S.W.2d 157, 160-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
169. See Posey v. State, 916 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet.
granted).
170. Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 60.
171. Almanza also expressly considered article 36.19 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, which provides that error in the jury charge shall not result in reversal if the require-
ments of the rules (articles 36.14, 36.15, 36.17, and 36.18) have not been met unless the
error was "calculated to injure the rights of the defendant, or unless it appears from the
record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial." Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at
160. Article 36.14, for example, requires that a defendant object in writing to errors in the




manza but also made clear that defensive issues must be presented to the
trial court in order to be raised on appeal. 172 Unlike the court of appeals,
which had determined that the trial court committed reversible error by
failing sua sponte to instruct on the defensive issue mistake of fact, the
Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the duty sua sponte to submit a
charge applied only to the law "applicable to the case. ' 173 The court in
Posey concluded that defensive issues are not "applicable to the case"
within the meaning of article 36.14 "unless the defendant timely requests
the issue or objects to the omission of the issue in the jury charge."'1 74
The court rejected the contention that its holding "effectively overrule[d]
Almanza," stating "[w]hen Almanza speaks of 'errors' of commission and
omission in the court's charge, it speaks of issues upon which a trial court
has a duty to instruct without request or objection from either party...
or issues that have been timely brought to the trial court's attention."'175
VIII. EXPERT TESTIMONY
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided important issues with
respect to expert testimony during the Survey period. In Nenno v.
State176 the court considered whether to apply the general principles
enunciated by the court in Kelly v. State177 and by the United States
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 78 with
respect to scientific evidence and expert testimony proffered under both
the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 702 and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 702, to "nonscientific expert testimony (i.e. that involving technical
172. See Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 60-62.
173. Id. at 62. The Code of Criminal Procedure imposes upon the trial courts the duty
to instruct the jury on the law "applicable to the case." Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 36.14).
174. Id. The court also distinguished its previous decision in Williams v. State, which
held the trial court erred in failing sua sponte to instruct on the defensive issue of "release
in a safe place" during the punishment phase of an aggravated kidnapping prosecution,
because at that time the degree of offense was based upon this factor. Id. at 62 (citing
Williams v. State, 851 S.W.2d 282, 284, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). "Williams was based
on prior V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Section 20.04(b), which provide[d] that aggravated kidnap-
ping is a first degree felony unless the actor voluntarily releases the victim alive and in a
safe place in which event the offense is a second degree felony." Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 63.
The court further noted that "V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 20.04(d) now requires the
defendant to raise and prove [that issue]." Id. The dissent remarked upon the majority's
"notable effort attempting to dismiss or somehow distinguish Williams," and concluded
that "[t]hey might as well overrule it because it can't be distinguished." Id. at 75.
175. Id. at 61 n.9. A concurring opinion warned of "the confusion that will ensue"
because the court's Posey opinion "directly contradicts the basis of Almanza's reasoning."
Id. at 68 (Womack, J. concurring). The dissent, characterizing the majority's decision as a
holding that "a defensive issue does not become 'applicable to the case' until a jury charge
on the issue is requested by the defendant[,]" warned that the decision "stands in stark
contrast to recent precedent which rejects the notion that parties are responsible for ensur-
ing that the charge embodies their respective 'theories of the case."' Posey, 966 S.W.2d at
71 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (Meyers, J., dissenting)).
176. 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
177. 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc).
178. 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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or other specialized knowledge)." 179
In Kelly the court held:
Rule 702 [which permits expert testimony if scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact] required the
satisfaction of a three-part reliability test before novel scientific evi-
dence would be admissible: (1) the underlying scientific theory must
be valid; (2) the technique applying the theory must be valid; and (3)
the technique must have been properly applied on the occasion in
question.18
The court later applied these standards to all scientific evidence in
Hartman v. State.'8' The Nenno court concluded with a "qualified 'yes,'
that the Kelly and Daubert standards would apply to nonscientific expert
testimony. 182 Stressing that the standards are flexible, the court indicated
that the factors enunciated in Kelly and Daubert may or may not apply to
the context presented, but the court made no attempt "to develop a rigid
distinction between 'hard' science, 'soft' sciences, or nonscientific
testimony."1 83
In Nenno, testimony regarding the appellant's future dangerousness
was admitted at the punishment phase of his capital murder trial, at which
he was sentenced to death. An expert witness from the FBI's behavioral
science unit, who specialized in the study of victimization of children, tes-
tified that the appellant was a pedophile and that pedophiles are difficult
to rehabilitate. The appellant complained that the expert's testimony
failed to satisfy Kelly's reliability test and, further, that designating the
testimony as that of an "expert" unduly influenced the jury. 84 Applying
deliberately flexible standards, the court concluded that the reliability of
the expert's testimony was sufficiently shown. 185
In Schutz v. State,'86 a decision made prior to that in Nenno, the Court
of Criminal Appeals adopted a more rigorous analysis. The appellant,
convicted of the aggravated sexual assault of his six-year-old daughter,
complained that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony re-
garding the credibility of the child. The Court of Criminal Appeals
agreed, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the
cause to that court so that it could conduct a harmless error analysis. The
court concluded that expert testimony which directly commented upon
the truthfulness of a witness was not testimony which assisted the jury in
179. 970 S.W.2d at 560.
180. Id. (citing Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573). In Daubert, the Court held that Rule 702
required that scientific evidence be both relevant and reliable, the latter evaluation requir-
ing determinations of whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the con-
cerned scientific community and has been tested, published and subjected to peer review,
as well as consideration of the potential or known rate of error. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
589-90.
181. 946 S.W.2d 60, 62-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
182. 970 S.W.2d at 560.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 559-60.
185. See id. at 562.
186. 957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
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making its determinations but, rather, usurped the jury's role. 187 The
case involved expert psychological testimony regarding indicia that the
child's testimony and "memory" had been manipulated, and also expert
testimony about fantasy and indicia that the child's testimony was based
on reality as opposed to fantasy.
The court reviewed much of the burgeoning jurisprudence on the sub-
ject throughout the country, pointing out that "[a]t least one court has
noted that there is a 'fine but essential' line between helpful expert testi-
mony and impermissible comments on credibility.' 188 The court ob-
served: "Because we have never addressed the manipulation/fantasy
question under the Rules, we look to other jurisdictions for guidance in
drawing this 'fine line.' Such guidance is especially appropriate here be-
cause the rules of evidence in Texas and most other states are patterned
after the Federal Rules of Evidence. '189
The court then canvassed the treatment of this question in various ju-
risdictions and concluded that "[m]ost jurisdictions specifically addressing
expert testimony concerning manipulation [or] fantasy have held the par-
ticular testimony involved to be an impermissible comment on a witness'
credibility."'190 The court noted, for example, that the Massachusetts
Supreme Court "upheld the exclusion of a defense psychologist's testi-
mony that 'the mother's animosity could have influenced the child to
make false accusations of sexual abuse."' 191 The Court of Criminal Ap-
peals apparently approved of the Massachusetts court's conclusion that
such an opinion "'would have impermissibly intruded on the function of
the jury to assess the credibility of the child witness.' ' 1 92
Similarly, the Court of Criminal Appeals observed that in State v. Er-
ickson' 93 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion of expert
testimony about "learned memory" offered in support of the defense the-
ory that the child witness "had been coerced and suggestively inter-
viewed.' 94 The Court of Criminal Appeals also mentioned the New
Jersey Supreme Court's distinction between commentary on the credibil-
ity of the child witness, which was inappropriate, and "expert testimony
[offered] to explain the coercive or suggestive propensities of interview-
ing techniques employed" which should be admitted if sufficiently relia-
ble.1 95  Conversely, the court noted that some jurisdictions held
manipulation testimony admissible. 196 For example, the Seventh Circuit
has held "that an expert witness did not invade the province of the jury
187. See id. at 59.
188. Id. at 60 (citing State v. Myers, 382 N.W. 2d 91, 98 (Iowa 1986)).
189. Id. (footnotes omitted).
190. Id.
191. Shutz, 957 S.W.2d at 60-61 (citing Commonwealth v. Trowbridge, 647 N.E.2d 413,
419 (Mass. 1995)).
192. Id. at 61.
193. 454 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
194. Schutz, 957 S.W.2d at 61 (citing Erickson, 454 N.W.2d at 628).
195. Id. (citing State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372 (N.J. 1994)).
196. See id. at 62.
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where his testimony 'merely dealt with his opinion that [the complain-
ant's] allegations were probably fabricated and were the product of pa-
rental and therapeutic suggestion."'"1 97
Having canvassed the decisions with respect to expert testimony in this
area, the court concluded: "Most courts addressing the issue of capacity
have not favored the admission of such evidence.... According to these
courts, absent a recognized mental disorder or deviant mental condition,
an expert witness may not testify to the jury about another witness'
mental capacity for truth-telling."' 98 Following this exhaustive evaluation
of the case law from other jurisdictions, the Court of Criminal Appeals
opined: "We are convinced that the concept of truthfulness properly in-
cludes mental capacity as well as moral disposition .... [A]ttempting to
distinguish moral and mental truthfulness raises unanswerable questions
about human nature."199 Acknowledging that "psychologists and others
in the mental health profession have much expertise in the area of human
behavior that can be of assistance to a fact-finder," the court nevertheless
rejected "'expert testimony on truthfulness,' . . . in part [due to] a belief
that psychology is not an exact science but involves much uncertainty and
is often subjective."'20 The court also cautioned against "permitting ex-
perts to draw conclusions that rest on both expert and lay knowledge." 201
In the court's view, "evidence of manipulation and fantasy, whether
relating to mental capacity or moral disposition, should be analyzed
under the same rules that govern evidence of truthful or untruthful char-
acter. '202 The court pointed out, for example, that under the rules of
evidence, "a party may attack a witness' or other declarant's general ca-
pacity or disposition to tell the truth[, and] [t]he other party may respond
to such an attack with evidence supporting that person's general capacity
or disposition for truthfulness.120 3 The court noted further that "evi-
dence relating to capacity, fantasy, or manipulation is presented in the
form of expert testimony, such evidence must also assist the trier of fact
.... "21 Such testimony, the court continued, "must meet the proper
tests for scientific reliability, and the testimony must reflect information
outside the general knowledge of lay persons. And, such testimony may
be excluded under Rule 403 if the probative value of the evidence is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ....
Notwithstanding its extensive discussion of the authorities in this com-
plex area, the court made clear its own position: "[Elvidence that a per-
son's allegations are the result of manipulation or fantasy is inadmissible.
197. Id. (citing Doe By and Through G. S. v. Johnson, 52 F.3d 1448, 1463 (7th Cir.
1995)).
198. Id. at 65 (citing State v. Oliver, 372 S.E.2d 256, 260 & N.2 Ga. Ct. App. 1988)).
199. Shutz, 957 S.W.2d at 68.
200. Id. at 69.
201. Id.
202. Id. (footnote omitted).
203. Id. (citing TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 608(a) (footnote omitted)).
204. Shutz, 957 S.W.2d at 70 (citing TEX. R. CRiM. EvID. 702).
205. Id. (citing TEX. R. CRiM. EVID. 403).
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Such evidence never assists the jury because the jury is just as capable as
the expert of drawing the conclusions involved. 2 0 6 In evaluating the case
before it, the court distinguished between the testimony about fantasy
and about manipulation offered by both experts. The court concluded
that one expert's testimony "that the complainant did not exhibit the
traits of manipulation" did not "constitute a direct comment upon the
truth of the complainant's allegations. 20 7 The same expert's testimony
about fantasy, however, was considered improper. Since the expert
"equated fantasizing with lying[, h]er testimony that the complainant had
not exhibited any evidence of fantasizing was therefore a direct comment
on the truthfulness of the complainant's allegations. '20 8 The second ex-
pert commented directly upon the witness' truthfulness in the context of
both fantasy and manipulation and, accordingly, the court held that the
testimony should have been excluded.20 9
In Weatherred v. State,210 a case involving a capital murder conviction
and sentence of life imprisonment, the Court of Criminal Appeals re-
manded for reconsideration in light of its Nenno decision.21' The court of
appeals ruled that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony
regarding photo bias and eyewitness identification and accordingly re-
versed the conviction and remanded for a new trial.212 The Court of
Criminal Appeals remanded the case for an evaluation of the admissibil-
ity of the expert testimony in light of Nenno's standards for "admission of
expert testimony in the 'soft' sciences, that is, 'fields of study aside from
the hard sciences, such as the social sciences or fields that are based pri-
marily upon experience and training as opposed to the scientific
method.' 213
IX. SELF-DEFENSE
In Smith v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted review "to
resolve some conflicts in [its] opinions on that aspect of the law of self-
defense known as the doctrine of provocation or provoking the diffi-
culty. '214 The appellant raised self-defense at his murder trial and the
jury was instructed both on self-defense and the law on provocation. The
court of appeals affirmed the appellant's conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter.21 5 The appellant contended in finding evidence of provocation
206. Id. at 70-71 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 73.
208. Id.
209. See Shutz, 957 S.W.2d at 73.
210. 975 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
211. See Nenno, 970 S.W.2d 549.
212. See Weatherred v. State, 963 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, pet.
granted).
213. Weatherred, 975 S.W.2d at 323-24.
214. 965 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).




that the court of appeals failed to follow decisions of the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals. Nevertheless, the court affirmed.
Visiting the issue of provocation for the first time in a decade, the
Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that the doctrine remains some-
what uncertain.216 The doctrine of provocation is rooted in the common
law, codified in the Penal Code,217 and acts as a limitation upon self-de-
fense. In commenting upon it, the court observed:
A charge on provocation is required when there is sufficient evi-
dence (1) that the defendant did some act or used some words which
provoked the attack on him, (2) that such act or words were reason-
ably calculated to provoke the attack, and (3) that the act was done
or the words were used for the purpose and with the intent that the
defendant would have a pretext for inflicting harm upon the other.218
The court in Smith found there was sufficient evidence to satisfy the
first element of provocation; that is, that the defendant did or said some-
thing which caused the deceased to attack him. Viewing the evidence
"most favorably to giving the instruction establishes that the appellant
was arguing loudly late at night with [another] in the victim's home,
which caused the victim to intervene and warn the appellant to cease. '219
When he did not, the victim attacked him.
The appellant contended that the court of appeals' decision conflicted
with its decision in Stanley v. State.220 Although it rejected the notion
that its decision conflicted with the one in Stanley, the Court of Criminal
Appeals nevertheless concluded that "Stanley was wrongly decided" due
to "an incorrect application of the law to the facts. '221 In Stanley, the
court found "no evidence that the appellant made any motion, spoke any
words, or performed any act at the time which caused the deceased to
first attack the appellant thereby furnishing the appellant with a pretext
for killing the deceased. '222
In Stanley, an altercation between the defendant and the victim
culminated in the deceased's attack upon the defendant, who then killed
the victim. The source of the altercation was the defendant's lie to the
victim about a land purchase and the victim's confrontation of the appel-
lant regarding that lie. There was also evidence in Stanley that the de-
fendant had attempted to obtain a firearm and had made a statement
threatening to kill the victim a few hours before the altercation. The
court in Stanley concluded that the evidence "show[ed] that the de-
ceased's attack on the appellant was unprovoked. '223
216. See Smith, 965 S.W.2d at 513.
217. TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. § 9.31(b)(4) (Vernon 1996).
218. Smith, 965 S.W.2d at 513.
219. Id. at 514-15.
220. 625 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
221. Smith, 965 S.W.2d at 515.
222. Id. (citing Stanley, 625 S.W.2d at 323).
223. Id. (citing Stanley, 625 S.W.2d at 323).
[Vol. 52
CRIMINAL LAW
The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the result in Stanley and stated
that provocation exists even where there is no "conclusive evidence as to
what the act or words which caused the provocation actually were. '224 It
is not necessary, the court reasoned, for the jury to be able "to put its
hands on the particular act or words which resulted in the attack. Rather,
the jury must merely be able to find that there was some provoking act or
words. This protects the defendant's right of self-defense, while adhering
to the principle of the law of provocation. '225 The court reasoned:
The jury [in Stanley] could have properly inferred that the defend-
ant's act of lying caused the confrontation and that defendant's
words which preceded the attack on the defendant by the deceased
were the cause of the attack, even though we do not know what
these words were, when coupled with the facts that defendant had a
few hours earlier attempted to obtain a handgun and stated that he
was going to kill the victim. 226
The court concluded that "such a scenario presents the classic case of
provoking the difficulty. "227
The appellant asserted that the lower court's decision also conflicted
with the decision in Williamson v. State,228 in which the court concluded
that the evidence was insufficient to support provocation. Again, as in
Stanley, the court stated that its decision had "encroached on the jury's
province as fact-finder in Williamson. '229 In Williamson, the defendant
informed his roommate he would have to move out because he could not
afford to feed him. This angered the roommate who acted as though he
would attack the defendant. The defendant then confronted the room-
mate and accused him of being a burglar, at which point the victim at-
tacked the defendant and was killed. "Upon reconsideration of
Williamson, in light of the principles we have highlighted today, we see
that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could properly find
that the defendant did some act that provoked the difficulty. '230
In order to ensure "that a defendant will not lose his right of self-de-
fense over acts or words which cause an unwarranted attack[,] "the sec-
ond element which must be established to support provocation is that the
defendant's acts or words must have been "reasonably calculated to pro-
voke the attack. '231 The court concluded that the evidence in Smith,
viewed in a light favorable to a charge on provocation, showed that the
appellant was engaged in an argument with another person when the vic-
tim intervened and in effect warned the appellant (even displaying a knife
for effect at one point) that continued argument would "have a volatile
effect on the victim such that the victim might, and probably would, have
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Smith, 965 S.W.2d at 516.
227. Id.
228. 672 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).





attacked the appellant to make good on his warning; ' 232 and the appel-
lant nevertheless "continued the abusive language towards [the person],
and the victim consequently attacked the appellant. '233 This continued
argument by the appellant, the court reasoned, "could have been found
by the jury under the circumstances to have been reasonably calculated to
cause an attack by the victim. '234
Finally, the provocation doctrine requires that the defendant perform
the provoking acts or speak the provoking words intending to create a
pretext for killing the victim but without such an intent, the defendant
does not lose his right of self-defense. 235 This question of intent is one for
the jury.236 The court stated that "[t]he question of whether an act or
words were reasonably calculated to cause an attack is a question of fact
for the jury to resolve. 237
The court concluded that "[t]he evidence [in Smith] supports the con-
clusion that the appellant continued to argue with [the person] knowing it
would elicit an attack from the victim. ' 238 The court then reasoned as
follows:
This poses the question: What was the intent of the appellant in con-
tinuing to verbally abuse [the person]? It could have been to con-
tinue the argument for its own sake, regardless of the probability of
further intervention from the deceased, or it could have been to con-
tinue the argument to inspire the deceased to attack the appellant so
that the appellant would have a pretext for killing the deceased. 239
The court concluded that the record revealed evidence which would
support the jury's finding of intent: "the appellant was agitated that the
victim had left him at the night club;" the appellant argued "with the
victim about a matter involving a crack cocaine pipe;" and "appellant
continued to argue with [the person] ... after knowing that it excited the
victim and would likely result in an attack. '240
The appellant also argued in Smith that the provocation charge was
improper because the evidence simply conflicted as to who was the first
aggressor, a matter which does not warrant a charge on provocation. 241
The appellant relied upon Dirck v. State242 "for the proposition that a
charge on provocation should not be given if the evidence merely con-
flicts as to who made the first attack. ' 243 The court of appeals believed
evidence was not conflicting and showed only that the victim was the first
232. Id. at 517.
233. Id. at 517-18.
234. Smith, 965 S.W.2d at 518.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. Id. at 517 (citing Garcia v. State, 522 S.W.2d 203, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)).
238. Id. at 519.
239. Smith, 965 S.W.2d at 519.
240. Id. at 519.
241. See id.
242. 579 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
243. Smith, 965 S.W.2d at 519.
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aggressor, despite the appellant's claim that the evidence showed he was
the first aggressor. The Court of Criminal Appeals, on the other hand,
concluded that both the court of appeals and the appellant were incorrect
because although "there was conflicting evidence about who made the
first attack, the evidence was not merely in conflict about who made the
first attack. '244
In conclusion, the court overruled the appellant's ground for review
even though "the jury's finding the appellant guilty of the lesser included
offense of voluntary manslaughter on a charge of murder means that they
in fact rejected the provocation claim by the State, and the appellant's
claim of self-defense. '245 The court concluded that the jury rationally
could have found every element of provocation beyond a reasonable
doubt and that accordingly the trial court properly submitted the issue to
the jury:
It is neither our responsibility nor our role to decide if the evidence
actually established that the appellant provoked the difficulty with
the intent to harm the deceased. That question is properly within the
province of the jury as judge of credibility and finder of fact. We
hold merely that the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to pass
on the issue.246
X. CAPITAL MURDER
In Ex parte Robert James Tennard,247 the Court of Criminal Appeals
again considered whether the record in question established the existence
of mental retardation and if so, whether that evidence was submitted in a
manner which enabled the jury to accord mitigating effect to the evidence
in the case of youthful incarceration and mental retardation.2 48
A capital murder prosecution requires the submission of two special
issues to the jury: (1) "whether the conduct of the defendant that caused
the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the rea-
sonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would re-
sult;" and (2) "whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society. '249 A failure to provide the jury with a means to give effect to
mitigating evidence violates the standards enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Penry v. Lynaugh.250
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 519-20.
247. 960 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
248. The case was before the court on Tennard's post-conviction application for writ of
habeas corpus. The habeas corpus petition was brought pursuant to Article 11.07,
V.A.C.C.P., after the court affirmed Tennard's conviction and sentence on direct appeal
and the Supreme Court had denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. See Tennard v.
State, 802 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
249. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 37.071(b)(1), (2).
250. 492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
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The court in Ex parte Tennard first described the applicant's participa-
tion in the brutal murder of two neighbors in their home during a rob-
bery, as well as the circumstances -of a particularly brutal felony rape for
which the applicant had been convicted and was on parole at the time he
committed the murders. The court then observed that the sole evidence
proffered on "mental retardation" was a Texas Department of Correction
record from the period of his incarceration for the rape conviction which
indicated, without elaboration, that he had an IQ of sixty-seven. The only
other evidence applicant offered was his age (twenty-two at the time he
committed the offense) and the fact that most of his formative years were
spent in incarceration. The court rejected the applicant's contention that
the special issues failed to give the jury a vehicle to give mitigating effect
to these matters.
As a threshold matter, the court determined that evidence of the appli-
cant's low IQ score "standing alone" did not prove mental retardation. 251
In fact, the court found no evidence in the record that the applicant was
mentally retarded:252
"According to the American Association on Mental Retardation
(AAMR), a person is considered to be mentally retarded only when there
is evidence of: (1) subaverage general intellectual functioning, (2) concur-
rent deficient and adaptive behavior, and (3) onset during the early de-
velopment. '253 The court evaluated the claim of mental retardation in
light of these standards and observed that "'mental retardation' means
significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is concurrent
with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmen-
tal period. '254 Moreover, the court continued, "'person with mental re-
tardation' means a person determined by a physician or psychologist
licensed in this state or certified by the department to have subaverage
general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive behavior. '2 55
The court did state, however, that even if evidence of the "applicant's
low IQ somehow falls within Penry's definition of mental retardation, '256
the applicant was not entitled to relief under Penry because there was no
"'reasonable likelihood that the jury ha[d] applied the challenged instruc-
tion[s] in a way that prevent[ed] the consideration of constitutionally rel-
evant evidence.' '2 57 In contrast, Penry presented evidence that his
mental retardation diminished his ability to control his conduct and con-
form it to the requirements of the law and therefore, the special issues
placed these mitigating qualities beyond the effective reach of the jury.
In Tennard's case, however, the court found:
251. See Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d at 61.
252. See id. at 62.
253. Id.
254. Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(13) (Vernon 1992)).
255. Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 591.003(16) (Vernon 1992)).
256. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d at 61.
257. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367-71 (1993)).
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[T]here is no evidence applicant's low IQ rendered him unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct when he committed the
offense, or that his low IQ rendered him unable to learn from his
mistakes or diminished his ability to control his impulses or to evalu-
ate the consequences of his conduct.258
The court thus reasoned that "there was no danger, as in Penry, that
the jury would have given any mitigating qualities of the evidence of ap-
plicant's low IQ only aggravating effect in answering special issue
two."
2 5 9
The dissent responded that the court's ruling offended an "unbroken
line of cases since the Supreme Court's decision in Penry" in which the
Court of Criminal Appeals "has held [that] evidence of mental retarda-
tion cannot be adequately considered within the statutory punishment is-
sues." 260 The dissent believed that "the majority ignore[d] [this settled
precedent] to reach a desired result."'261 The dissent emphasized that
"[w]hen the evidence raises a fact issue concerning the defendant's
mental retardation, the defendant is 'entitled to an instruction empower-
ing the jury to assess a penalty less than death, notwithstanding affirma-
tive answers to the special issues, as a 'reasoned moral response' to the
fact of his mental retardation. '262
The dissent continued its criticism, stating that "[w]hat the majority has
done, in clear contravention of established precedent, is weigh the suffi-
ciency of applicant's mitigating evidence and establish a legal threshold a
defendant must meet to be entitled to a Penry instruction. '263 In the dis-
sent's view this offended precedent:
This court has long held that it will not weigh mitigating evidence. A
defendant is entitled to an instruction on every mitigating issue
raised by the evidence, regardless of whether the evidence is strong
or weak, unimpeached or contradicted and regardless of whatever
the trial judge may think about the credibility of the offense.264
The dissent also observed that "[i]n Penry, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that an IQ score of seventy or below classifies an individual
as 'mentally retarded.' ' 265 "Accordingly, under the prior decisions of
both the United States Supreme Court and this court, the applicant's IQ
of sixty-seven is presumptive of his mental retardation and the majority's
holding that there is 'no evidence in this record that applicant is mentally
retarded' is simply wrong. ' 266 The dissent also challenged the majority's
conclusion that "there is a nexus requirement between the evidence of
the applicant's mental retardation and his moral culpability," because
258. Id. at 62.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 67 (Baird, J., dissenting).
261. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d at 67.
262. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Rios v. State, 846 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
263. Id. at 70.
264. Id. (citing Arnold v. State, 742 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).
265. Id. at 71 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 308 n.1).
266. Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d at 71.
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"this conclusion flies in the face of established precedent of this State. 267
The dissent conceded that the court's decisions applying Penry have ordi-
narily required a "'nexus between the mitigating evidence and culpability
for the crime,' ''268 but not "a nexus between mental retardation and the
capital offense. '269
XI. OFFER OF PROOF
In Warner v. State,270 the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the de-
fendant had not preserved for appeal the issue of whether evidence of
post-traumatic stress disorder was improperly excluded. The defendant
was charged with aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and arson.
Before trial, the state filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence of
treatment for any stress disorder until the court had determined rele-
vance outside the presence of the jury. At a hearing on the motion, ap-
pellant objected to the motion in limine and advised the trial court that
"he intended to offer evidence at the guilt/innocence stage that he had
been a veteran of the Vietnam War, that he suffered 'post-traumatic
stress disorder' (PTSD), and that he had received counseling for that dis-
order. '271 Relying on Cowles v. State,272 the appellant argued that the
evidence "was admissible to prove that he had not had the specific intent
necessary to commit the offenses of aggravated kidnapping and arson." 273
The trial court granted the State's motion in limine and also found that
evidence of PTSD, although admissible at the punishment stage, would
not be admissible at the guilt or innocence stage. The appellant did not
offer the evidence in question and subsequently was found guilty. His
argument regarding the exclusion of this evidence was later rejected by
the court of appeals. 274 The appellant's petition for discretionary review
was granted by the Court of Criminal Appeals which, upon consideration,
dismissed the petition as improvidently granted, because the issue had
not been preserved for review. The court added the caveat that "dismis-
sal must not be construed as approval of the reasoning or holding of the
Court of Appeals. '275
The court found that the appellant had not preserved the issue for re-
view, because he had not "define[d] 'post-traumatic stress disorder' for
267. Id. at 72.
268. Id. (quoting Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111, 141 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
269. Id.
270. 969 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
271. Id. at 1.
272. 510 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
273. Warner, 969 S.W.2d at 1. The court in Cowles "recognized that evidence of a de-
fendant's abnormal mental condition falling short of legal insanity is admissible whenever
that evidence is relevant to the issue of whether he had the mental state that is a necessary
element of the crime charged." Id. at I n.1 (citing Cowles v. State, 510 S.W.2d at 610).
274. See Warner v. State, 944 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (Tex. Crim. App.-Austin 1997, pet.
granted).




the court or explain[ed] how he intended to prove that he suffered from
the disorder .. .[nor did he] explain how evidence of PTSD would be
relevant to the question of specific intent. '276 In these circumstances, the
court concluded, no sufficient offer of proof had been made.277 The court
then stated that an adequate "offer of proof may be in question-and-an-
swer form, or it may be in the form of or a concise statement by counsel"
which "include[s] a reasonably specific summary of the evidence offered"
and a statement of "the relevance of the evidence unless the relevance is
apparent, so that the court can determine whether the evidence is rele-
vant and admissible." 278
276. Id. at 1-2.
277. See id. at 2. In ruling that the error had not been preserved, the court noted:
"Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 103(a)(2) provides that error may not be predicated
upon a ruling which excludes evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected and
the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer of proof or was appar-
ent from the context within which questions were asked." Id.
278. Id. (citing Love v. State, 861 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)).
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